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North Korean Asylum Seekers in the West: Is Dual Nationality Dispositive? 
 
Abstract: Since at least 2013, Western courts judging refugee cases have accepted that North Koreans 
are, with rare exceptions, considered to be South Korean nationals under South Korean law. This article 
explores the implications. Given this dual nationality, are North Koreans necessarily refused refugee 
status, because they can be protected in South Korea? Or are there still routes to refugee status that may 
be available? In this article, I find that North Koreans continue to have potential paths forward in their 
search for refugee status in the West. There are, broadly speaking, four different types of protection 
arguments evident in the jurisprudence from major host states. These are: that an asylum seeker 
possesses a well-founded fear of persecution in South Korea as well as North Korea, that South Korean 
nationality does not provide a right to enter the country, and should therefore be disregarded; that South 
Korean nationality should not be recognized because it is not bestowed in a manner consistent with 
international norms; and that an individual asylum seeker falls into an exceptional category whereby he 
or she lacks South Korean nationality. Each of these arguments has in certain cases proved successful, 
at least provisionally. 
I. Introduction  
On first glance, many observers would suppose that North Korean escapees could easily qualify 
for asylum in the West. After all, North Korea is ruled by a brutal regime which engages in torture, 
arbitrary imprisonment, and political executions.1 In fact, North Koreans face a considerable barrier: 
dual nationality. North Koreans are considered to be South Korean nationals pursuant to South Korean 
domestic law.2 This means that, pursuant to article 1(2) of the Refugee Convention, they must 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in South Korea as well as North Korea in order to be 
considered refugees.3 This would, presumably, be a tall task. It is normally easy to show a fear of 
persecution in North Korea, because (amongst many other possible reasons) the Kim regime imputes 
adverse political views to unauthorised emigrants and punishes returnees harshly.4 However, South 
Korea is a prosperous and free country, which provides considerable support and benefits to North 
Koreans upon their arrival. Commentators have, therefore, naturally assumed that North Koreans’ dual 
nationality would make it impossible for them to find asylum in the West.5 
                                                          
1 See, generally, KOREA INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION (‘KINU’), WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2020 (2021); U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in the DPRK, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
DPRK, A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014). 
2 See, Andrew Wolman, The South Korean Citizenship of North Korean Escapees in Law and Practice, 
4 KLRI J. L. & LEGIS. 226 (2014). 
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art 1(2). The United 
States is an exception: Congress has statutorily mandated that North Korean escapees shall not be 
considered South Korean nationals for the purposes of refugee determination. See North Korean Human 
Rights Act, HR 4011, § 302(B) (2004). 
4 See, Jung-hyun Cho, Protection of North Korean Escapees under International Law: Their Refugee 
Status, 1(2) J. PEACE & UNIFICATION 31(2011). 
5 See, e.g., JAMES BURT, EUROPEAN ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, A CASE FOR 
CLARIFICATION: EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY AND NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 18 (2015) (South 
Korean nationality ‘would disqualify North Koreans from claiming international protection’); Sheena 
Greitens, The Geopolitics of Citizenship: Evidence from North Korean Claims to Membership in the 
South, J. KOR. STUD. (forthcoming in 2021) (“in claiming North Koreans as citizens, the ROK remove 
their grounds for claiming asylum/refugee status in most other countries.”); JEEWON MIN, NUMBERS 
SHOW FEWER NORTH KOREANS ADMITTED: DUAL NATIONALITY AND REFUGEE STATUS, IOM-MRTC 
 In this article, I question whether dual nationality is in fact dispositive. In short: do plausible 
legal arguments still exist for North Koreans to gain asylum in an environment where they are also 
considered South Korean nationals, and if so, have these arguments met with any success? I address 
these questions for the first time in the academic literature, through an analysis of published asylum 
appeals from eight Western countries that have historically received significant numbers of asylum 
claims from North Koreans: the UK, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia. I find that there are four different types of arguments that have been put forward. 
First, and most commonly, that a North Korean escapee in fact has a well-founded fear of persecution 
in South Korea as well as North Korea; second, that South Korean nationality does not provide a right 
to enter the country, and should therefore be disregarded for refugee determination purposes; third, that 
South Korean nationality should not be recognized because it is not bestowed in a manner consistent 
with international norms, and fourth, that a particular asylum seeker falls into an exceptional category 
whereby he or she lacks South Korean nationality.6 All of these arguments have met with at least 
provisional success in select cases. While the number of North Korean finding asylum in the West has 
certainly fallen considerably since 2013 (when their dual nationality became universally 
acknowledged), plausible paths to protection still exist, although they are heavily dependent on the facts 
of the case and the jurisdiction where asylum is being claimed.7 
II. North Korean Refugees in the West 
Ever since the authoritarian Kim family took over North Korea, there have been cases of North 
Koreans fleeing to seek asylum elsewhere. Between the end of the Korean War and the late 1990s, the 
number of North Korean escapees was relatively low, however, and most settled in South Korea.8 While 
there were isolated instances of North Koreans seeking refuge in Germany and other Western countries, 
case numbers were minimal.9  
                                                          
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 2018/07 10 (2018) (formerly welcoming destination countries “now consider [North 
Koreans] ineligible for refugee status for their dual nationalities”) 
6 This article does not focus on avenues for complementary protection (i.e., protection outside the scope 
of the Refugee Convention) for which standards often differ considerably in different countries. 
However, as discussed briefly in the conclusion section, alternative forms of protection have at time 
also been successfully invoked by North Korean escapees.  
7 According to UNHCR figures, in 2012 there were a total of 1,126 North Korean refugees and people 
in refugee like situations. This figure had decreased to 753 by 2020. UNHCR REFUGEE DATA FINDER, 
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=q21PzZ (last visited July 7, 2021). These 
figures do not include North Koreans in South Korea, who are not considered as refugees under South 
Korean law. 
8 Prior to 1994, a total of 641 North Korean escapees had settled in the South. An additional 305 North 
Koreans arrived between 1994 and the end of 1998. Andrei Lankov, Bitter Taste of Paradise: North 
Korean Refugees in South Korea, 6 J. OF E. ASIAN STUD. 105,108 (2006). 
9 Of particular note are a wave of 21 North Korean students who sought asylum in West Germany in 
1959. Ben Osborn, The S-Bahn from Pyongyang: Berlin's North Korean History, EXBERLINER (Nov. 
8, 2019), https://www.exberliner.com/features/history/the-s-bahn-from-pyongyang/. Several North 
Korean students and workers in Eastern Europe also escaped to the West around the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989. Two North Korean students defect to Seoul through Berlin Wall, UPI (Nov. 16, 1989). 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/11/16/Two-North-Korean-students-defect-to-Seoul-through-
Berlin-Wall/8406627195600/. By 1999, however, UNHCR recorded only a total of ten North Korean 
refugees (or people in a refugee-like situation) at a global level. UNHCR REFUGEE DATA FINDER, 
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=V93zbA (last visited July 7, 2021). These 
numbers do not include North Koreans in South Korea.  
However, in the wake of the catastrophic famine of 1994-8, living conditions in North Korea 
deteriorated, and the number of North Koreans fleeing their country rose dramatically.10 This exodus 
has continued to the present day, although the number of escapees has diminished since 2012 as Kim 
Jong un has tightened borders,11 and plummeted in 2020, when borders around the world tightened due 
to the Covid-19 pandemic.12  
Many of these North Korean escapees survive on the margins of Chinese society, where they 
often face exploitation and the threat of repatriation.13 A few have requested resettlement in the United 
States14 or proceeded directly to a Western country to request asylum.15 The vast majority, however, 
have traversed China via ‘underground railroad’ to Southeast Asian countries, from where South 
Korean embassy officials assist in their resettlement in South Korea. Upon arrival in the South, they are 
given resettlement assistance, including housing, financial support, and educational subsidies.16 They 
receive a passport and are treated as citizens. As of March 2021, a total of 33,783 North Korean escapees 
have been resettled in South Korea.17 
Once settled in South Korea, North Korean escapees continue to face a range of challenges. In 
many cases they encounter discrimination and resentment from the local population and difficulties 
entering the highly competitive South Korean job market.18 A minority of North Koreans in the South 
have proven unable to find security or satisfaction in the South, and instead chosen to seek asylum in 
                                                          
10 See, Lankov, supra note 8, at 109. 
11 Teodora Gyupchanova, Why fewer and fewer North Korean defectors are making it to South Korea, 
NK NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nknews.org/2020/02/why-fewer-and-fewer-north-korean-
defectors-are-making-it-to-south-korea/ (last visited July 7, 2021). 
12 The number of escapees reaching South Korea decreased to 229 in 2020 from 1,047 the previous 
year. Colin Zwirko, North Korean defectors arriving in the South drop by 78% in 2020 — a record low, 
NK NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nknews.org/2021/01/north-korean-defectors-arriving-in-the-
south-drop-by-78-in-2020-a-record-low/ (last visited July 7, 2021). 
13 See, generally, Andrea Rakushin Lee, The Challenges of North Korean Refugees in China, THE ASIA 
DIALOGUE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/03/the-challenges-of-north-korean-
refugees-in-china/ (last visited July 7, 2021). 
14 The United States refugee status and resettlement assistance to escapees who have not previously 
settled in the South. North Korean Human Rights Act, HR 4011, § 302(B) (2004). Very few North 
Koreans choose this option: a total of eight arrivals in fiscal years 2018-20. Robert King, Number of 
North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades, CSIS COMMENTARY (Jan. 27, 2021), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades (last 
visited July 7, 2021). 
15 Directly seeking asylum in the West is rare, however, for logistical reasons. It is normally only a 
feasible route for those escaping from, for example, overseas labor sites, embassies, or shipping vessels, 
rather than those crossing the Chinese land border, which is the most common route for escape. Andrei 
Lankov, Why some North Korean defectors choose not to live in the South, NK NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nknews.org/2018/02/why-some-north-korean-defectors-choose-not-to-live-in-the-south/ 
(last visited July 7, 2021). KINU, supra note 1, at 540. 
16 REPUBLIC OF KOREA MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, 
https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/ (last visited July 7, 2021). 
17 REPUBLIC OF KOREA MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, 
https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/ (last visited July 7, 2021). 
18 Jiyoung Sung and Myong-Hyun Go, Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean 
Refugees, ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Aug. 8, 2014); Survey: North Korean refugees report 
discrimination, lower earnings, THE HANKYOREH (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/677750.html (last visited July 7, 2021). 
Western nations, in a form of ‘secondary migration’.19 The reasons for this choice are varied, and 
include poverty, social isolation, resentment at discrimination against North Koreans, and a desire for 
better educational opportunities for their children.20  
III. Dual Nationality and North Korean Escapees: Legal Background 
According to South Korea’s Nationality Act, an individual is a Korean national if their “father 
or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of a person’s birth”.21 Republic of Korea 
(South Korean) nationality descends from the Chosun nationality that applied throughout the Korean 
peninsula prior to 1948.22 The co-existence of North Korean nationality would not affect this 
determination, as North Korea is not recognized as a separate country in South Korea.23 This means that 
North Koreans are normally considered South Korean nationals from birth. There are, however, three 
exceptional circumstances where North Koreans would not be South Korean nationals, namely: North 
Korean nationals of a non-Korean ethnicity (i.e., immigrants to North Korea and their descendants); 
North Korean nationals who have voluntarily taken on the citizenship of a third country; and North 
Korean nationals who can trace their Korean lineage only through maternal descent prior to June 14, 
1998.24 This conclusion has been recognized by South Korean courts,25 the South Korean government,26 
and the great majority of legal scholars.27  
Prior to 2013, the existence of dual South-North Korean nationality was not always well 
understood in the West, and South Korean nationality was sometimes ignored or dismissed in refugee 
                                                          
19 See, e.g., Jay Jiyoung Song & Markus Bell, North Korean Secondary Asylum in the UK, 7(2) 
MIGRATION STUD., 160 (2019); Jin Woong Kang, Human Rights and Refugee Status of the North Korean 
Diaspora, 9 N. KOR. REV. 4, 5 (2013) (“one in three North Korean escapees is heading to countries 
other than South Korea, and many escapees want to defect to Western countries, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom”); Byung-Ho Chung, North Korean Refugees as Penetrant 
Transnational Migrants, 43(4) URB. ANTHRO. 329, 332 (2014) (noting that “nearly 10% of North 
Korean migrants in South Korea have re-migrated to other countries”).  
20 Kyungja Jung et al., The onward migration of North Korean refugees to Australia: in search of 
cosmopolitan habitus, 9(3) COSMOPOLITAN CIV. SOC. J. 1, 4 (2017); Lankov, id.  
21 Gukjeokbeob [South Korea Nationality Act], Act. No. 16, Dec. 20, 1948, art. 2, amended by Act. No. 
10275, May 4, 2010. 
22 Yi Yonsun Case, Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 96Nu1221, Nov. 11, 1996 (S. Kor.). See, 
generally, Chulwoo Lee, South Korea: The Transformation of Citizenship and the State-Nation Nexus, 
40 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 230, 234 (2010).  
23 See Nationality Act Case, Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Heonga12, Aug. 31, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
24 Wolman, The South Korean Citizenship of North Korean Escapees, supra note 2, at 234. This final 
exception results from the fact that while North Korea always permitted the transmission of nationality 
by maternal lineage, prior to 1998 South Korean nationality could only be transmitted by the paternal 
line. 
25 Yi Yonsun Case, supra note 22; Nationality Act Case, supra note 23. 
26 According to the Minister of Diplomacy and Trade, “our country does not recognize the nationality 
of North Korea. Therefore, a resident of North Korea can be considered as having our nationality”. 
Nationality Act Case, supra note 23. 
27 See, e.g., Eric Yong-Joong Lee, “Human Rights Protections of North Koreans in a Third Country: A 
Legal Approach,” 4(1) Journal of Korean Law 155, 169 (2004); In Seop Chung, Chulwoo Lee, Ho Taeg 
Lee and Jung Hae Park, “The Treatment of Stateless Persons and Reduction of Statelessness: Policy 
Suggestions for the Republic of Korea,” 13 Korea Review of International Studies 7, 22 (2010); Patricia 
Goedde, “Determining Refugee Status for North Korean Refugees under International and Domestic 
Laws,” 11(2) Sungkyun Journal of East Asia Studies, 143, 153 (2011).   
determination decisions.28 In part, this was due to ambiguity on the part of South Korean government 
officials, who at times mistakenly stated that North Korean escapees had to ‘acquire’ or ‘apply for’ 
South Korean nationality, when in fact they simply had to apply for their existing South Korean 
nationality to be recognised.29 Significant numbers of North Koreans were granted asylum in the UK, 
Canada, and elsewhere.30  
By 2013, however, the dual nationality of North Korean asylum seekers seems to have become 
well understood in all of the destination countries reviewed in this article.31 In a number of countries, 
clarification on the dual nationality was provided by the issuance of country guidance32 or the 
publicization of new correspondence with South Korean officials.33 The number of North Koreans 
applying for asylum in the West decreased, as did the total number of North Korean refugees. Today, 
dual nationality is well accepted: as one German court recently stated, “it has not only been the 
unanimous case law of German administrative courts but also of the asylum courts of other host 
countries in the world that North Koreans … automatically possess South Korean citizenship”.34  
Interpretation of the complexities of South Korean nationality law was also rendered 
unnecessary around this same time by increased cooperation between South Korean authorities and 
destination states with respect to fingerprint sharing.35 South Korean authorities had long maintained a 
fingerprint database of North Korean settlers. Refugee determination officers now began to share 
asylum seekers’ fingerprints with the South Korean government, with the result that in the large 
majority of cases asylum seekers were confirmed as having in fact already settled in South Korea, before 
                                                          
28 See, eg, Kim v Canada, [2010] FC 720 (Can.); Cour nationale du droit d'asile [CNDA], 
640897/08021356, Mlle H, Dec. 14, 2009 (Fr.); RRT Case No. 00/31605 [2000] RRTA 225 [Refugee 
Review Tribunal], February 29, 2000 (Austl.). Prior to 2008, UK Operational Guidance Note on North 
Korea did not mention the issue of dual nationality. UNITED KINGDOM HOME OFFICE, OPERATIONAL 
GUIDANCE NOTE: NORTH KOREA (Dec. 19 2006), http://www.refworld.org/docid/46029cbe2.html (last 
visited July 7, 2021).  
29 Wolman, The South Korean Citizenship of North Korean Escapees, supra note 2. 
30 In 2012, there were 619 North Korean refugees in the UK; 138 in Germany, 119 in Canada, and 
smaller contingents in many other Western countries. UNHCR REFUGEE DATA FINDER (2017), 
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics (last visited July 7, 2021) (these figures include both refugees 
and those in refugee-like situations). 
31 Canada was the last country to accept that North Koreans are South Korean nationals, in a Refugee 
Appeals Division judgment from July, 2013. See X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76469. ¶¶61-2 (CA IRB) (Can.). 
See, generally, Seunghwan Kim, Lack of State Protection or Fear of Persecution? Determining the 
Refugee Status of North Koreans in Canada, 28 INTL. J. REF. L. 85 (2016).    
32 IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDES - DECISION TB4-05778 
(June 27, 2916), ¶ 76. 
33 See, X (Re), 2016 CanLII 73070 (CA IRB) (Can.) (citing letter from South Korean embassy 
confirming that “North Korean-born persons are deemed nationals of the Republic of Korea”); 0909118 
[2010] RRTA 1054, ¶37 (Nov. 24, 2010) (Aust.) (citing letter from South Korean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, that “citizens of the DPRK are treated as citizens of the ROK automatically by virtue 
of their residence on the Korean peninsula”). 
34 Verwaltungsgericht Freiburg [VGF] [Freiburg Administrative Court], decision of Aug. 3, 2020, A 9 
K 9336/17 (Ger.). 
35 See, Andrew Wolman & Guobin Li, Saeteomin Asylum Seekers: The Law & Policy Response, 27 
INTL. J. REF. L. 327 (2015); Jeewon Min & Sarah Son, Credibility Evidence, Documentary Information 
and Case Assessment in North Korean Escapee Asylum Claims in Canada and the United Kingdom, 
MRTC Working Paper Series No. 2019-02 (2019), p. 7. 
choosing to seek asylum elsewhere.36 Thus, where there was a match, the claimant could be presumed 
to be a South Korean national – de facto as well as de jure. With fingerprint matching in place, many 
individuals who had previously been accepted as refugees had their refugee status revoked for 
misleading the authorities on issues of nationality.37  
IV. Paths to Protection 
Despite the barrier of dual nationality, North Korean asylum cases have continued to arise in 
Western courts, albeit in far smaller numbers than previously.38. These cases involve both new arrivals 
and earlier arrivals whose cases were reopened when their previous settlement in South Korea was 
uncovered through fingerprint checks. In some instances, North Korean asylum claims have been 
successful: according to UNHCR, from 2013-2020, 127 North Korean asylum seekers were awarded 
refugee status (along with another 156 who were given complementary protection), while 1,162 North 
Koreans had their claim rejected.39 While North Koreans were accepted at a far greater rate prior to 
2013,40 this still represents an acceptance rate that is significantly higher than that of individuals 
classified by UNHCR as South Korean nationals (who presumably lack dual North Korean 
nationality).41 In this section, I will further explore these cases, by examining the arguments used in 
them, and the circumstances in which they have been successful.  
A. Persecution in South Korea 
 According to the Refugee Convention, dual nationals can still qualify as refugees if they can 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in each of their countries of nationality. As such, it has 
become common for North Korean asylum seekers to claim a fear of persecution in South Korea, as 
well as North Korea. With respect to North Korean escapees, there have been four grounds to fear 
persecution that have been prominently put forward: discrimination; threat to personal safety; threat to 
                                                          
36 See, e.g., Sujin Cho, ‘Talbukjae nameun je 3gukhaeng gyeongyuji?’ [The South is a Place of Transit 
for a Third Country for North Korean Defectors?] Donga Ilbo (Oct 15., 2013), 
http://news.donga.com/3/all/20131015/58216537/1 (last visited July 7, 2021); Raad voor 
Vreemdelingen-betwistingen nr. 167 364 van 10 mei 2016 in de zaak RvV X / IV (Belg.) (vast majority 
of North Korean asylum seekers in Belgium had previously settled in South Korea). In some countries, 
it has also been reported that significant numbers of asylum seekers claiming to be North Korean are in 
fact (ethnically Korean) Chinese nationals. See Jiyoung Song, Twenty Years’ Evolution of North 
Korean Migration, 1994–2014: A Human Security Perspective, 2(2) ASIA & PAC. POL’Y. STUD., 399, 
408 (2015); KINU, supra note 1, at 545. 
37 See, e.g, Raad voor Vreemdelingen-betwistingen nr. 106 220 van 2 juli 2013 in de zaak RvV X / IV 
(Belg.); Verwaltungsgericht Köln Urt. v. 26.06.2012, Az.: 14 K 4133/10.A (Ger.); Bak v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 CanLII 11767 (FC) (Can.). 
38 In 2019, there were 117 North Korean asylum seekers, down from 1,023 in 2012.  UNHCR REFUGEE 
DATA FINDER, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=q21PzZ (last visited July 7, 
2021). . In part, this is likely due to a tightening of the North Korean border under Kim Jong Un, which 
is shown in lower numbers of escapees making it to South Korea as well. It may also be a reflection of 
improved conditions for North Koreans in South Korea, or a perception among North Koreans living in 
the South that they are no longer able to easily find secondary asylum in the West. 
39 UNHCR REFUGEE DATA FINDER, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=qUG3g1 
(last visited July 7, 2021).  
40 From 2005-2012, 1,213 North Koreans were given refugee status and 130 given complementary 
protection, while 888 North Koreans had their claim rejected. UNHCR REFUGEE DATA FINDER, 
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=b27TVk (last visited July 7, 2021).  
41 During 2013-2020 there have only been 65 South Korean refugees recognised and none given 
complementary protection, with 960 South Korean nationals experiencing rejection. UNHCR REFUGEE 
DATA FINDER, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=qUG3g1 (last visited July 7, 
2021). 
safety of one’s family; and direct persecution by South Korean authorities, often based on political 
opinion.42 Each of these arguments will be examined in turn. 
As an initial matter, however, it is worth noting that the first three of these arguments do not 
rest on a claim that the South Korean state is intentionally persecuting North Koreans. Such a claim 
would, in many cases, be implausible, as South Korean authorities are quite supportive of North Korean 
settlers and their successful integration into South Korean society, which is assisted by a significant 
range of support services. Rather, asylum claimants argue that the South Korean government is unable 
to prevent such persecution being perpetrated by other actors. This is sometimes called the ‘protection 
theory’, which holds that persecution can exist if, for whatever reason and despite the best of intentions, 
the State cannot “reduce the risk of persecutory harm arising from unlawful interference by non-state 
agents”.43 The protection theory of persecution is well accepted in most of the world, although France, 
Germany, and a few other countries have traditionally required that the state itself be the agent of 
persecution.44 
1. Discrimination in South Korea 
 It is well-documented that North Koreans can face considerable prejudice and discrimination 
in South Korean society.45 For some, employment discrimination can make it difficult for North Korean 
escapees to earn an adequate income.46 From the perspective of the Refugee Convention, however, the 
question is whether this discrimination, which clearly seems to be based on a protected ground 
(nationality or membership in a particular social group) reaches the level of persecution. In many cases, 
courts have ruled that discrimination against North Koreans, while indisputably existing, does not lead 
to serious harm that can be characterised as persecution.47 This conclusion has also been enshrined in 
UK country guidance, which states that ‘[f]ormer North Koreans may have difficulty in adjusting to life 
in South Korea and there may be some discrimination in social integration, employment and housing, 
but this is not at a level which requires international protection’.48 
 However, such dismissals are not universal. In the New Zealand appeals case of AL, an asylum 
claim centred on persecution through discrimination did meet with success.49 Here the appellant had 
suffered discrimination in the employment market, along with romantic disappointment and even 
physical assault on account of his North Korean background. This adversely affected his mental health 
and caused him to become suicidal. After a rejection at first instance, the tribunal found in the 
                                                          
42 In some cases, multiple types of potential persecution are put forward; with the argument that the 
cumulative effect is to produce a serious harm. See, e.g., X (Re), 2020 CanLII 62452 (CA IRB) (Can.); 
AC (North Korea) [2019] NZIPT 801589 (18 November 2019) (N.Z.). 
43 AL (South Korea) [2016] NZIPT 800858, ¶ 85 (19 May 2016) (N.Z.).  
44 JAMES HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 306 (2d ed. 2014). 
45 Sung & Go, supra note 18. 
46 Tara Oh, The Integration of North Korean Defectors in South Korea: Problems and Prospects, 2 
INTL. J. KOR. STUD. 151, 158 (2011). 
47 See, e.g., Hong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 913 (Can.); X (Re), 2015 CanLII 
105649 (CA IRB) (Can.) (acts of discrimination “do not amount to persecution, as they did not 
constitute a denial of a fundamental human right or amount to serious harm, even when considered 
cumulatively”); RRT Case No. N05/50475 [2005] RRTA 387 [Refugee Review Tribunal], Feb. 24, 2005 
(Austl.); Raad voor Vreemdelingen-betwistingen nr. 116 260 van 20 december 2013 in de zaak RvV X 
(Belg.). 
48 UK Home Office, Country Information and Guidance North Korea: Opposition to the Regime 
(October 2016), at § 3.1.4. 
49 AL (South Korea), supra note 43.  
appellant’s favour on appeal, and awarded refugee status.50 It found that his right to work and non-
discrimination rights had been violated by discriminatory treatment, and that while the financial effects 
of future employment discrimination could not be characterised as a serious harm, the appellant’s 
precarious state of mental health meant that future incidents of employment discrimination would likely 
lead to serious psychological harm.51  
 This emphasis on psychological vulnerability also played a role in the Canadian court’s 
decision in Kim v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration).52 In this case, which involved 
complementary protection rather than refugee recognition, the claimant had faced discrimination at a 
youth shelter, in the job search process, and during employment, leading to suicidal thoughts.53 His 
initial application to stay in Canada was denied due to insufficient evidence that he would face hardship 
in South Korea. At judicial review, the court overturned the denial and requested reconsideration, 
because the refugee officer had failed to meaningfully engage with “country conditions that 
demonstrated a pattern of discrimination against North Korean defectors [and] the Applicant’s hardship 
in relation to his mental health condition and high suicide rates in South Korea”.54 
2. Threat to Personal Safety  
 Another claim often made by North Korean asylum seekers is that if they are returned to South 
Korea, their presence would become known to North Korean agents active there, and that this could put 
them in danger of political assassination or kidnapping by the Kim regime. South Korean authorities, 
according to this argument, are unable to effectively protect them from these serious harms, and they 
therefore face persecution in both North and South Korea.  
There certainly is a long history of prominent North Korean escapees being targeted for 
abduction or assassination by North Korean authorities, both in South Korea and elsewhere.55 During 
Kim Jong Il’s time in power, this included the 1997 assassination of Lee Han-young, nephew of one of 
Kim Jong Il’s former wives, as well as the attempted assassinations in 2009 of Hwang Jang Yop, former 
senior member of North Korea’s Workers’ Party and of prominent dissident Park Sang Hak in 2011.56 
There have been no publicized reports of defectors being physically targeted in South Korea since Kim 
Jong Un took over in 2012, although death threats have been made against North Korean escapees 
involved in sending balloons with anti-Kim propaganda over the border.57  
The case law has so far mostly rejected claims of persecution via personal threat. In AC, a New 
Zealand tribunal dismissed this argument despite the claimant having assisted other escapees, provided 
information to South Korean agents, and worked with a defector NGO, concluding that he had “no real 
profile”.58 In Park v. Barr, a U.S. court approved a finding that even if the claimant were targeted for 
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harm, South Korean authorities would be willing and able to protect him.59 A Canadian case similarly 
held that South Korea’s mechanism for identifying North Korean informants and assassins was 
“functioning quite well”, and that in fact potential harms could occur anywhere, as North Korean agents 
are active all around the world.60 In one German case from 2020, the court dismissed the persecution 
claim, while laying out specific circumstances in which it might be found valid, namely where claimants 
are former government or military officials, or other individuals in whom the North Korean authorities 
might have particular interest for activities that go beyond illegal emigration.61 
However, these types of arguments have on a few occasions seen at least provisional success. 
In a recent Canadian case, the appellant claimed that she had acted as a spy on behalf of South Korean 
authorities, and that she (and her family) had therefore been targeted by North Korean agents while in 
South Korea.62 While her asylum claim had been dismissed at first instance on credibility grounds, this 
dismissal was overturned on appeal and remanded for reconsideration, with the court acknowledging 
the possibility of persecution in the particular circumstances experienced by the claimant.63 A fear of 
retaliation by North Korean agents also played a role in a Canadian court’s grant of refugee status in 
2020.64 
Meanwhile, in the AC appeals judgment from New Zealand, the claimant reported that he had 
received a series of anonymous phone calls and text messages accusing him of being a traitor to North 
Korea and threatening to kill him.65 The tribunal did not find that he faced any physical risk. However, 
it found that such threats (if they were to recur upon being returned to South Korea) would have a 
particularly harmful effect on the claimant’s already fragile mental health, and would in fact qualify as 
persecution, taking into account the poor mental health services and high suicide rate in South Korea.66 
3. Threats to the Safety of One’s Family 
 A related argument is that sending a North Korean escapee to South Korea would put that 
person’s relatives who remain in North Korea at risk of persecution. Harm committed towards one’s 
family member can constitute a form of persecution, if such harm is likely to cause serious 
psychological harm to the asylum seeker.67 Potential familial harm has been deemed serious enough to 
warrant refugee status in certain other instances.68 In practice, however, such claims are often 
overlooked: a UNHCR audit revealed a “lack of appreciation that the fear of what might happen to a 
family member can be persecutory to the main applicant”.69 
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In the Korean context, it is widely acknowledged that escaping North Korea can pose a threat 
to the security of one’s remaining family.70 According to the Korea Institute for National Unification, 
the regime at one point announced “that three generations of that family would be wiped out (punished) 
if any family member defected”.71 One key question, however, is whether returning an escapee to South 
Korea would in fact materially increase the likelihood that the individual’s family remaining in North 
Korea would be harmed. To an extent, this would be fact-dependent. If the North Korean authorities 
are already aware of an individual’s escape or if the individual has no surviving family, then return to 
the South would make no difference. However, in other cases, one could make an argument that return 
to South Korea would in fact increase the risk, for two reasons. First, it is widely believed that there are 
large numbers of North Korean spies active in South Korea, who could be expected to report back on 
new arrivals in the community.72 Second, South Korea keeps records of North Korean settlers that may 
be susceptible to North Korean hacking, as in fact occurred in 2018.73 
 The argument of familial risk has been made on numerous occasions, and has been addressed 
most thoroughly in a series of cases from the Netherlands.74 Here, tribunals have acknowledged that 
North Korean spies are active in the south, and that escapee family members can face a range of negative 
consequences.75 However, they do not accept the existence of a generalised risk that warrants protection, 
but have instead held that each case must be judged on an individual basis as to risk of detection and 
potential consequences. In particular, the tribunals have relied upon correspondence with the South 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold that only families of valuable or high-ranking North Korea 
are likely to suffer severe consequences. In most cases, this has led to protection being denied.76 
However, one 2015 case was remanded for reconsideration because the finding that the claimants were 
not sufficiently valuable was not well justified, as both had previously been arrested by North Korean 
agents, one for selling information to South Korea, and the other for selling information to China.77 
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4. Direct Persecution by the South Korean Government 
Claims centred on direct persecution by the South Korean government have been less common. 
A few types of claims have recurred, however. First, there are claims of persecution by the South Korean 
National Intelligence Service (‘NIS’) or rogue elements within it. There is a certain plausibility to such 
claims, due to the steady stream of scandals that the NIS has recently been implicated in, most relevantly 
the forging of documents in order to frame a North Korean escapee as a Northern spy.78 In a recent 
Canadian case, the North Korean claimant stated that he had received specific threats from NIS agents 
in South Korea. The court accepted that a “wide variety of human right oriented concerns with respect 
to the NIS have continued to be reported” and awarded refugee status.79  
Second, there have been claims alleging political persecution against North Koreans, generally 
focused on the repressive effects of South Korea’s National Security Law.80 In an early Australian case, 
an asylum seeker alleged that he would face persecution under the NSL due to his continued activity 
assisting other North Koreans to escape, and his contact with family members in the North.81 Australia 
granted refugee protection, concluding that there was a real chance of persecution, especially given 
evidence that the NSL was sometimes applied in an arbitrary manner.82 Meanwhile, in a 2013 New 
Zealand case, a South Korean claimant who had made pro-North Korean statements online was given 
asylum in New Zealand based on a fear of persecutory application of the NSL.83 While the claimant in 
this case was not originally from the North, it does highlight a potentially viable argument for the small 
minority of North Korean escapees who end up adopting a pro-North Korean political stance.84 Of 
course, in recent years, the converse argument might be more plausible: that South Korean persecution 
is a real fear due to a claimant’s political activism against North Korea. As one might expect, North 
Korean escapees often have strong negative feelings about the Kim regime, and some have alleged that 
the Moon Jae In administration has violated their human rights by prohibiting them from disseminating 
certain forms of anti-Kim propaganda in its efforts to promote peaceful relations with the North.85 
Finally, it is worth noting a last plausible argument, although it has not been successful in the 
cases surveyed in this article; namely, that the security detention and subsequent three-month mandatory 
‘retraining’ at the Hanawon Centre that North Koreans face upon initial entry to South Korea is a form 
of arbitrary detention that constitutes persecution on the basis of nationality and social group. This 
would be a tough argument: major human rights actors have suggested improvements to the Hanawon 
detention system, but have seldom condemned it outright. However, there have certainly been 
objections to this type of detention among North Koreans, some of whom have brought domestic 
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lawsuits against the South Korean government, alleging that their detention constitutes a human rights 
violation.86 So far, the arbitrary detention argument has seldom been made in refugee claims, perhaps 
in part because it could only apply to asylum seekers who have not previously settled in the South.87 
B. Ineffective South Korean Nationality 
Another argument that has been used by North Korean asylum seekers is that even if they do 
formally possess South Korean nationality, that nationality should be seen as ‘ineffective’, and not 
recognized for purposes of refugee determination, because in practice it does not provide a right to 
actually enter and reside in South Korea. Most commonly, claimants argue that they lack the right to 
enter South Korea because they fall into one of the article 9 exceptions of the Protection Act.88 The 
Protection Act stipulates that  South Korea will provide ‘protection’ of North Korean escapees, with 
the exception of five categories of people for whom protection will be denied, namely:  
1. International criminal offenders involved in aircraft hijacking, drug trafficking, 
terrorism or genocide, etc; 
2. Offenders of non-political, serious crimes such as murder, etc; 
3. Suspects of disguised escape; 
4. Persons who have for a considerable period earned their living in their respective 
countries of sojourn; and 
5. Such other persons as prescribed by the Presidential Decree as unfit for the designation 
as persons subject to protection.89 
Prior to 2013, however, there was a lack of clarity as to what “protection” means. While it certainly 
refers to the resettlement benefits that North Koreans receive upon arriving in South Korea, some 
claimed that the right to enter South Korea from foreign states (as facilitated by South Korean embassy 
officials) was also an element of protection.90  
Given this lack of clarity, some argued that where a claimant falls into one of the article 9 
exceptions of the Protection Act, then South Korean nationality should be presumed ineffective, 
because the claimant would lack the right to enter South Korea.91 A number of tribunals in civil law 
jurisdictions have embraced this analysis, at time leading to successful claims. For example, in the 
French case of M.G., a North Korean asylum seeker who had spent over ten year outside of North Korea 
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(thus potentially falling into the fourth exception of the Protection Act) was given refugee status.92 The 
same presumption was embraced in a recent German case, where the tribunal chose to grant refugee 
status to an individual who had already lived for seventeen years in Germany at the time of his 
application.93  
 In one controversial case from the Netherlands, the court ruled that the State had the burden of 
proving that a North Korean claimant would not be denied entry to South Korea due to being a suspected 
spy.94 This ruling prompted a reaction from the Dutch authorities, who now faced the challenging task 
of showing whether South Korean officials would consider a given escapee to be a spy or not. Later in 
2014, Dutch officials requested and received clarification from the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that North Korean escapees would be treated as South Korean nationals, even if they were found to be 
spies during the investigation process that accompanies their transfer to South Korea.95 Subsequent 
courts cited this letter in finding South Korean nationality to be effective.96 
Other courts, especially in the common law world, have firmly rejected this type of effective 
nationality analysis.97 In Australia, resort to effective nationality analysis was statutorily rejected in 
1999,98 a rejection that was upheld with respect to North Korean escapees in 2012.99 In the UK, effective 
nationality analysis was rejected in principle in both KK & Ors and GP & Ors.100 In the latter case, the 
tribunal perhaps needlessly went on to assert that South Korean nationality was in any case entirely 
effective, as North Koreans were permitted to enter South Korea even where they fell into one of the 
Protection Act exceptions.101 Canada later issued jurisprudential guidance that similarly asserted that 
South Korean nationality is, in practice, effective.102 
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The factual assertion that the Protection Act does not regulate the right to enter South Korea 
has seemed largely accurate for many years, and was accepted by the South Korean government in 
2014.103 However, it has recently been drawn into question. In November 2019, South Korean forces 
captured a fishing boat in South Korean waters, with two North Korean fishermen aboard.104 Upon 
investigation, they found that the men had murdered 16 of their fellow crew members before crossing 
the sea border. The two men were rapidly sent back to North Korea. This was the first reported instance 
of South Korea sending North Korean escapees back to the North against their will, and led to a public 
outcry.105  
In order to justify the expulsion, South Korean authorities stated that the North Koreans fell 
into one of the article 9 exceptions to the Protection Act due to their commission of serious crimes.106 
While one should perhaps not read too much into the statement, as the incident was clearly of an 
exceptional nature, it does seem to acknowledge that North Koreans who fall into the article 9 
exceptions of the Protection Act lack the right to stay in South Korea, and indeed risk deportation to the 
North. In addition to highlighting the potential ineffectiveness of South Korean nationality, the incident 
also draws into question whether South Korea is a permissible destination to return North Koreans, at 
least when they fall into an article 9 exception. After all, North Korea engages in capital punishment, 
along with myriad other human rights abuses of detainees, and it is a violation of the Refugee 
Convention’s non-refoulement obligations to send an asylum seeker to a third country which then expels 
that person to a place of persecution.107 In fact, the two deported fishermen have reportedly been 
executed.108  
C. Non-Opposability of South Korean Nationality 
It may also be possible for North Korean asylum seekers to argue that while they may be South 
Korean nationals as a matter of South Korean domestic law, that nationality does not need to be 
recognized (or, perhaps, must not be recognized) by third states. This could, perhaps, rely on the well-
known principle associated with the ICJ’s Nottebohm decision that a nationality that is valid under 
domestic law need not be recognized under international law if there is no “genuine connection” 
between the individual and the country concerned.109 The barriers to this argument are significant, 
however. While there have been a few refugee cases that have embraced the Nottebohm principle,110 
the large majority of academic opinion holds that it should be restricted to the diplomatic protection 
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context in which it was laid out.111 Even if a court did accept the principle, it is questionable whether 
North Koreans would be seen as lacking a genuine link to South Korea (that is to say, the Republic of 
Korea, which claims to be the successor state to their ancestral home).112 
In the 2011 case of Mlle K, the French National Court of Asylum used a somewhat different 
approach to find that while North Koreans may possess South Korean nationality under South Korean 
domestic law, that nationality should be disregarded for purposes of refugee status determination.113 In 
short, the court concluded that South Korea could not, through imposition of nationality, deprive foreign 
individuals of a refugee status that they would otherwise possess.114 The court’s reasoning did not rely 
on any purported lack of “genuine links”, but rather seems focused on the idea that South Korean 
nationality should be considered illegitimate because it is a form of collective involuntary 
naturalization.115 This is consistent with an ‘abuse of rights’ analysis most associated with Robert 
Sloane’s work.116  
D. Exceptional Lack of South Korean Nationality 
There are three exceptional circumstances in which North Korean nationals would not be 
considered South Korean nationals by South Korean authorities: when North Korean nationals are not 
of Korean descent (i.e. immigrants and their descendants); when North Korean nationals have 
voluntarily taken on the citizenship of a third country, and when North Korean nationals can trace their 
Korean lineage only through maternal descent prior to June 14, 1998 (the date at which South Korean 
domestic nationality law was reformed in order to treat men and women equally in line with that 
country’s international commitments under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women).117 The first of these exceptions has not arisen in the cases reviewed, as immigration 
to North Korea is unsurprisingly rare. 
The second exception was relied upon by the UK Upper Tribunal in KK & Ors.118 In this case, 
the appellants had all been living in China for over ten years prior to applying for asylum. The court 
found that they would not be allowed entry to South Korea, but the reasoning explicitly rejected an 
effective nationality analysis. Rather, the court found that South Korean authorities presumptively 
concluded that appellants who had spent over ten years in another country had lost their South Korean 
nationality through the acquisition of a second (non-North Korean) nationality.119 This result was later 
approved by the Court of Appeal, which emphasized that the relevant point was not whether or not the 
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appellants had actually acquired Chinese nationality, but rather whether they would be treated as having 
done so by South Korean authorities.120 
 The third exception has been put forth by North Korean claimants in Denmark and Australia. 
In the Danish case, the claimant’s assertion that his father was Chinese, and that he therefore lacked 
South Korean citizenship was summarily rejected on credibility grounds.121 The Australian cases of 
SZQYM and SZQYN also involved claims from North Korean escapees that were rejected by 
immigration officers on grounds of dual South Korean nationality.122 The (unrelated) claimants filed 
for judicial review, stating that they were born prior to 1998 and that their fathers had been born in 
China prior to the 1948 passage of the South Korean Nationality Act. Thus, they argued, neither they 
nor their fathers qualify as South Korean nationals. The Australian refugee authorities agreed that if, in 
fact, the claimants’ fathers had been born in China, then the appellants would not be South Korean 
nationals.123   
Hearing the appeals together, the primary judge expressed uncertainty as to whether it is 
actually correct that the appellants would lack South Korean nationality in these circumstances, but 
without expert testimony to rely on, he accepted the law as such.124 However, he was not satisfied that 
either of the fathers had indeed been born outside the Korean peninsula (due to certain ambiguities and 
credibility issues in the applications) and, therefore held that the applicants had not established that they 
lacked South Korea citizenship.125  
On appeal, the Federal Court overturned the judgment on grounds of burden of proof, 
concluding that the Court must find a lack of South Korean nationality unless the Court was convinced 
on a balance of probabilities that their fathers were born on the peninsula. 126 The Minister for 
Immigration was then asked to reconsider the appellants’ protection applications. The claims were once 
again denied, and the denial was once again appealed. This time, the claimants’ appeals were initially 
dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court on credibility grounds.127 However, the full Federal Court 
overturned the dismissal, this time due to the lower court’s misinterpretation of key expert evidence. 
Over a decade on from the initial applications, the claimants still await final decision on their protection 
visas.128 As is so often the case in North Korean – and other – refugee cases, credibility has emerged as 
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the key issue.129 Yet the cases do show the possibility of courts recognising exceptions to dual 
nationality, even if claimants face significant challenges in proving that they fall within those 
exceptions.  
E. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that possession of South Korean nationality makes it difficult for North 
Korean escapees to gain recognition as refugees. However, it is not always dispositive. Paths to refugee 
status still exist, at least in some cases. Claimants have argued – with occasional success – that they fall 
into one of the exceptional categories lacking South Korean nationality, or that their South Korean 
nationality should be disregarded for the purposes of refugee determination. Others have argued, again 
with occasional success, that they should be considered refugees due to a well-founded fear of 
persecution in both North and South Korea. Such arguments are contingent on the facts of the particular 
case, and on the credibility of the claimant. The arguments do not appear to be equally viable in all 
countries surveyed. Courts in New Zealand, for example, seem particularly likely to find a threat of 
persecution in South Korea. Meanwhile, civil law jurisdictions appear more receptive to claims of 
ineffective South Korean nationality than are common law jurisdictions such as the U.K., Canada and 
Australia. 
Of course, the Refugee Convention is not the only legal mechanism to access protection: 
complementary protection is available in Western countries under various provisions of domestic and 
international law. While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that a significant number of 
claimants have argued that expulsion to South Korea would not be in the best interests of a particular 
child, and that they therefore merit humanitarian protection. These arguments have met with some 
success in recent Canadian cases.130 Others have attempted to claim protection under the Convention 
against Torture (‘CAT’), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), and European 
Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), albeit with little success in reported judgments.131  
Reports also suggest that in certain countries, some North Koreans have been allowed to remain 
in their destinations despite serious questions about their identity, due to an unwillingness (or inability) 
of the host country to send them back to South Korea.132 In fact, there is little public pressure to deport 
North Koreans, even if they do have South Korean nationality. At the end of the day, one can only have 
sympathy for those who have fled one of the most oppressive regimes on earth, traversed an 
‘underground railway’ through China that is full of threats and danger, and arrived in South Korea, only 
to find themselves so insecure or discontented that they choose to seek asylum elsewhere. Whatever the 
legal justification, one hopes that Western societies can find a place for them to restart their lives. 
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